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4Water resource licensing is increasingly becoming a corner-
stone for integrated water resources management (IWRM). 
Licensing and other allocation mechanisms are important 
because they underpin who gets access to water and provide 
a means to manage water fairly, efficiently and sustainably. 
Water licensing is often in the hands of young institutions oper-
ating under new laws and sometimes organised along water 
basin rather than traditional administrative boundaries. 
With growing water scarcity in an increasing number of 
countries, there is a significantly greater risk of corruption 
in the water licensing process. This risk, and its underlying 
factors, are not well understood. This report explores the 
nature of the risk using a 2007 field study of Chile and Ka-
zakhstan as case studies for risk mitigation. The report was 
developed by the authors indicated below and thereafter 
revised by Jan Teun Visscher.
This study was supported by the Water Integrity Network 
(WIN) www.waterintegritynetwork.net, the Swedish Water 
House (SWH) www.swedishwaterhouse.se and UNDP Water 
Governance Facility at SIWI (WGF) www.watergovernance.
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5Many industrialised and non-industrialised countries are in 
the process of reforming their water resources management 
(WRM) frameworks. This includes establishing new institutions, 
sometimes at new scales (at catchment level rather than at ad-
ministrative units of districts or regions) with significant decision-
making and revenue collection powers. Water licensing is a 
very important mechanism for these institutions to determine 
who has access to water and how much they pay to use or 
pollute it. Water resource licenses, permits or permissions may 
cover a range of purposes including: regulation of abstraction 
of surface or groundwater, utilising or changing the course 
of water through damming or draining, and discharging 
pollutants into receiving waters. Increasingly, state regulated 
water licensing replaces other more traditional arrangements 
where the authority to allocate water was often vested in local 
traditional bodies. Some licensing arrangements make use of 
market mechanisms to allocate licences using the argument 
that this makes water management more transparent, account-
able, efficient, equitable and sustainable.
A water licence grants the right to abstract, use or pol-
lute a certain amount of water during a certain time period, 
subject to certain conditions, and often against a certain fee 
(Box 1). It may grant the use of a fixed amount (m3 per day) 
or a proportional (time) share of a water flow.
Licensing is part of a system to allocate and regulate 
water resources use. This system includes: the technical man-
agement, metering and monitoring of water abstraction and 
environmental indicators; enforcement mechanisms including 
Introduction
punitive actions in case of violations, non-performance or 
abuse; and mechanisms for complaints.
A licence implies rights and responsibilities for users and 
the issuing authority. It presupposes effective water control 
down to the level of the licence holder. If the licence is for a 
fixed amount (m3 per day), this amount needs to be available 
as well as the technical ability to measure abstraction. If the 
licence is in proportional (time) shares, the infrastructure must 
allow for regulation of the water division (water dividers). 
Water licensing is vulnerable to corruption and can be 
manipulated by the public officials responsible for licensing 
and those applying for a license. There is however a lack 
of systematic enquiries on the extent of corruption in water 
resources management (Lewis and Lenton, 2008) and water 
licensing processes, or the effectiveness of measures taken to 
A water licence provides an authority with a right to 
use or pollute surface water or groundwater. Use may 
be consumptive (where water is not returned to the 
source e.g. irrigation) or non-consumptive (hydropower, 
cooling). A licence normally identifies the water source, 
the location of abstraction, the amount of water to be 
impounded, diverted or abstracted, the priority of the 
"water right" established by the licence, and conditions 
under which the diversion and use must take place 
including limits on use, time limits and other restrictions 
such as drought conditions. 
Box 1: What is a water licence?
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6prevent corruption through measures such as fair procedures, 
accountability of officials, and publishing of licence registers. 
Even so, we can identify the main areas for potential cor-
ruption risks in water licensing (Table 1).
This study contributes to learning more about these issues 
by exploring the situation in two countries. One is Kaza-
khstan with a state-dominated water sector in the midst of 
economic and institutional reform, including turning former 
farm co-operatives into individual farm enterprises. The other 
is Chile which started to liberalise the water sector in 1981 
and is seen by many as the model for market-based initia-
tives (Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999). 
In both countries, water licensing is situated in a dynamic 
legal-administrative context and environmental reforms have 
recently been introduced. The paper reviews these aspects 
and concludes with recommendations and suggestions for 
future preventive measures that can be applied to strengthen 
transparency, integrity and accountability in water resources 
licensing. Key characteristics of the case study countries are 
seen in Box 2.
Table 1. Risk areas for potential corruption in water licensing
Risk area Explanation of risk
Licence application process Potential to influence the awarding process
The content of the licence Possibility to influence amount of water, timing, kind and amount of pollutant, 
safety margins, etc.
Bidding and trading procedures Opportunities to influence the bidding mechanism and to corner the market
Enforcement of licence Possibilities to avoid consequences of infringements (poor control measurement, 
paying bribes, etc.)
Box 2: Key characteristics of case study countries
Indicator Kazakhstan Chile
Total population 15 million 16 million
GDP 2007 (Purchasing power parity) USD 10,829 USD 13,885
TI Corruption Perception Index (2008) 2.2 (ranking 145) 6.9 (ranking 23)
Average annual precipitation 250 mm/year 1 522 mm/year
Total actual renewable water resources 7 086 m3/cap/yr 93 690 m3/cap/yr
Total water withdrawal 2 263 m3 per capita 803 m3 per capita
Agricultural water use (% withdrawal) 81.7% 63.5%
Domestic water use (%) 1.7% 11.3%
Industrial water use (%) 16.5% 25.2%
Total access to improved water supply 86% 95%
Total access to improved sanitation 72% 91%
Sources: FAO (2007) and WHO/ UNICEF (2006) 
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7This report is based on a rapid survey carried out between 
22 July and 15 August 2007 by two teams in Chile and in the 
Talas river basin in Kazakhstan. In total, 80 semi-structured and 
open interviews were held with licensors issuing water licences, 
water licensees, and other informants including NGOs, private 
sector managers, and the press to explore corruption risks in 
water licensing. The initial interviews were held with ‘gatekeep-
ers’ working in the sector known to the local researchers. From 
these first interviews other names were derived for subsequent 
interviews. In addition some field observations were possible 
by joining monitoring field visits which together with some lit-
erature review allowed for triangulation of information. Because 
the topic is sensitive, some information was provided under 
guarantee of anonymity. Where feasible this information was 
checked and included if validated by other respondents. The 
lead researcher was an ‘outsider’ with knowledge on the topic, 
working together with local researchers and water experts.
Reflection on study method
The rapid assessment approach allowed reaching well 
informed key actors in Chile and Kazakhstan. A lot of insight 
could be gained in a short time because the water sector 
is relatively small in both countries. However, a more com-
prehensive study is needed to understand all sub-sectors in 
detail. This may be more easily achieved in countries with 
strong anti-corruption NGOs such as Transparency Inter-
national chapters and multi-disciplinary university research 
groups interested in the topic.
Case Study Methodology 
In Chile which has a tradition of anti-corruption research, 
it proved very feasible to talk openly about it with NGOs, 
indigenous right lawyers and civil society leaders, whereas 
in the interviews with official institutions or companies, it 
seemed less advisable to use the word corruption openly. 
In Kazakhstan, the NGO sector is less developed and 
there is no significant tradition of corruption research or 
anti-corruption activism linked to water. In this country the 
team was accompanied by government staff during the 
interviews which, because of the sensitivity of the subject, 
may have restrained some of the informants in voicing their 
opinions. Also transport was a problem because of the large 
distance to research sites.
It proved important to plan interviews well in advance 
due to busy schedules of the actors involved. The combina-
tion of external and local researchers worked very well. The 
local researchers had a good understanding of the local 
setting and history, good contacts, and longstanding relation-
ships which fostered trust during the interviews. Having an 
external researcher also proved important as it sometimes 
helped to get appointments. Sometimes it proved easier for 
informants to talk to a “stranger.” Another important aspect is 
that the relative risk for an external researcher is smaller. A 
local researcher may lose job opportunities by researching 
and publishing on corruption and may face the threat of 
lawsuits and physical violence. A combined team of local 
and foreign researchers is therefore also recommended for 
future research.
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8Kazakhstan is a large, ethnically and culturally diverse country 
situated in Central Asia with a low population density of 5.4 
persons per km2. It is not a water scarce country even though 
a large part of the country is semi-arid. It declared itself inde-
pendent in 1991 after having been a Soviet republic since 
the 19th century. Economically it thrives as an important oil 
exporter with recent annual growth rates of some 10 percent. 
It has developed its industry with oil revenues, but agriculture 
remains important with a ‘water share’ of 82 percent. 
The country is facing important Water Resource Manage-
ment (WRM) problems which include inefficient water use in 
agriculture, inadequate wastewater treatment, and negative 
effects of the Soviet legacy of massive water diversion from 
the rivers Syr and Amu Darya for cotton irrigation resulting 
in the shrinking of Lake Aral. WRM in Kazakhstan is best 
described as being fragmented, underfunded and poorly 
governed. A decade of budget and staffing cuts has had a 
dramatic effect on the authorities’ ability to manage water 
(Hannan, 2008). However, with support from, UNDP, the 
Global Water Partnership, and others, Kazakhstan has made 
some significant improvement including the passing of a new 
Water Code in 2003 aiming to ‘achieve and maintain envi-
ronmentally friendly and economically optimal levels of use 
and protection of water for conservation and improvement 
of living conditions for population and environment .´ 
The code prioritises drinking water supply and desig-
nates the Water Resources Committee, under the ministry 
of agriculture, to issue all approvals related to surface and 
groundwaters. It also establishes the principles of river basin 
councils (RBC), which are advisory bodies of governmental 
organisations, water user associations (WUA), and NGOs 
set up to jointly resolve issues and implement basin agree-
ments. RBCs have now been established in all eight river 
basins and an IWRM plan was adopted in December 2008 
by the government. 
Still a lot needs to be done, however, to create meaningful 
change, particularly in agriculture where former state and 
collective farms have disintegrated and smaller private farm 
enterprises have been established. Allan and Steyl (2006) 
indicate for example that WUAs lack both financial and hu-
man resources and that NGOs are under-represented in the 
still toothless RBCs. On the positive side, the number of WUAs 
is expected to go up from 80 to 500 under the European 
Case study 1: Kazakhstan
Union funded Tacis programme, while the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) supports 
WUAs in obtaining rights and aims to create a transboundary 
basin council for the Chu and Talas Rivers. It is hoped that 
these efforts will increase access to information, and public 
engagement in the decision-making process.
 
Water allocation and licensing
According to the code all water resources are owned by the 
state, which decides about its use and disposal. Groundwa-
ter abstraction however is basically still unregulated (Allan 
and Steijl, 2006). The code distinguishes between general 
and specific uses of surface water. General use is a public 
right and is defined as using the water without applying 
technical means that have an impact on water conditions. 
Special use is defined as requiring facilities or technical 
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9devices and needs a licence or a permit. This includes use 
of water for agriculture, industry, electricity production, fish 
breeding and transport. Licensing is required for:
•	 Withdrawal	and	use	of	surface	water	for	agricultural,	
industrial, power engineering, fishing or transport 
needs in excess of 50 m3/sec (which over time will be 
extended to smaller volumes); and
•	 Withdrawal	and	supply	of	surface	water	for	second-
ary water users. 
Licences for irrigation are given by the Commission of 
Water Resources (CWR) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
to irrigation departments that in turn give out allocations to 
the newly formed WUAs and canal organisations. These ulti-
mately give farmers time allocations to water on the basis of 
this licence. Individual ‘permits’ are expected to be introduced 
in the near future. WUAs pay 10,000 tenge (USD 78) for the 
right to take irrigation water from the canal, and 100,000 
tenge (USD 780) to take it from the river. Informers indicate 
that this is not considered expensive by these organisations 
or the farmers, but getting the permission is the challenge. 
Once a license is issued, WUAs also have to pay for the 
water itself (the service). Water pricing was introduced in 
agriculture in 1997 to raise money to maintain and repair 
the deteriorating water delivery infrastructure. If the licensor 
judges that a farmer or WUA is not paying enough, they can 
cut them off for a few days as a warning. For the water users 
this can create severe problems and there is no mechanism 
in place for compensation, or redress. 
While farmers get allocated water as an individual quota, 
the infrastructure remains collective. There are still no meters 
or locks on gates. While during the time of the kolkhoz (the 
collective farm) there was always only one production unit and 
one crop, today, private farmers grow a variety of crops with 
different water requirements which are difficult to coordinate 
with the current infrastructure. In practice the means are mostly 
not in place to measure water deliveries to individual farmers 
10
accurately, and at best the charges are levied with reference 
to the duration of supply (Krutov & Spoor, 2006). Tail-end farm-
ers or even whole WUAs are often at the mercy of upstream 
water users (head-enders) (Wegerich, 2008a). 
According to several informants and field observations, 
there is a lack of logistics and infrastructure to seriously monitor 
water use, and water controllers are paid poorly. Inspectors do 
visit farms to measure and, if they observe irregularities, they 
can use their discretionary power to close gates (which then 
will be reopened upon payment). Under the rules, inspectors 
are supposed to measure water use in the whole area once 
or twice a day and get the signature of the WUA or farmer 
that a certain amount was delivered. This, however, may not 
provide reliable information on the daily water consumption. 
Moreover, the inspector may not be able to make it to the 
farm twice a day. In the study area (Talas), the inspectorate 
was chronically underfunded. It had only two cars to facilitate 
inspection, so inspectors have to go by bike, on horseback 
or walk. This situation needs considerable improvement to 
be able to provide reliable monitoring results and to ensure 
proper application of the terms of the licences. An other 
important problem is that the water availability is based on 
a transboundary agreement with Kyrgyzstan which has all 
the reservoirs on its side of the border, thus requiring clear 
transboundary cooperation (Wegerich, 2008b). 
A precondition for a well-functioning water licensing sys-
tem is dissemination of information (how to get a water right, 
rules and conditions, and sanctions, etc.) so that stakeholders 
know how the system works. For example, in Kazakhstan 
starting the application process is enough to claim a water 
right, you don’t have to wait for the permission to come 
through. But if you don’t claim the right, or don’t complete 
the necessary paperwork, you have no rights and others 
can claim your water. Our interviews showed that not all 
farmers are yet aware of this.
In water pollution licensing the situation is worse. Kaza-
khstan does not have extensive water quality legislation that 
is effectively enforceable. Attributing pollution to its source 
and identifying violations of permission to pollute are also 
problematic. If you measure water quality at the end of a 
channel that is polluted by 10 or 15 industrial companies, it 
is impossible to work out who polluted how much.
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Chile, with a population density of 22 persons per km2, has 
a length of 4,300 km and on average is 175 km wide. It 
has a hugely varied climate ranging from the world's driest 
desert in the north, through a Mediterranean climate in 
the centre, to a snow-prone Alpine climate in the south. Its 
economy is predominantly based on a range of primary 
resources, fishing, agriculture and industry. Hydro-electricity, 
cellulose production, mining and agriculture all require large 
amounts of water. Agriculture counts for 63.5 percent of water 
withdrawal and is mainly concentrated in large haciendas 
(farms) in the Central Valley. In the dry north, agriculture is 
more scattered and highly dependent on irrigation. 
The current Law of the Environment approved in 1994 
contains many modern provisions, such as Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs). In practice, however, the law is not 
fully applied and it favours economic criteria over technical 
criteria in decisions. Stakeholder and citizen participation in 
the process is hindered by insufficient technical assistance 
and support from the administration, caused by a lack of 
resources or excessive work load of its employees. Control 
of water projects is another problem, which, in principle, is 
in the hands of the administrative services related to the area 
of the project. In general, however, the administrative services 
staff do not have sufficient capacities to fulfil their duties. 
The position of the Government in the process is somewhat 
ambiguous. Environmental legislation is promoted but, at the 
Case study 2: Chile
same time, companies owned by the State have been in-
volved in water contamination. Another problem is that IWRM 
is especially challenging because surface and groundwaters 
are legally two different and completely independent entities. 
Furthermore, more than 30 state organisms have undefined 
competences in WRM (Amezaga et al. 2008).
Water allocation and licensing
Chile’s Civil Code of 1857 (inherited from Spanish law) 
indicated that all waters within natural banks are national 
goods for public use. Access was granted by a competent 
authority that could revoke the grant if the terms of use were 
not respected. The central authority decided about the water 
rights but had little understanding of the situation with the 
result that some users received large quantities whereas oth-
ers received too little. The Water Code of 1981 changed 
the situation and introduced market mechanisms to regulate 
water use. Water remains a public resource but the rights to 
use and develop it are private. This concept transforms water 
into an economic resource, regardless of its environmental or 
social value. The law establishes well defined property rights 
which are irrevocable and not connected to land ownership 
and gives legal security to investors. If water is available, 
Chile’s general water directorate (DGA) cannot refuse water 
grants, unless rights of earlier applicants are prejudiced. 
Initially the rights were free, but in several locations prices 
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have gone up as a result of the water right being granted to 
the highest bidder when multiple interested parties exist. 
Many see the water rights market in Chile as exemplary. 
De la Luz Domper (2009) for example indicates that it encour-
ages owners to manage and improve the quality of the water 
resource. It “guarantees that water is adequately priced, 
that supply and demand are linked to each other, and that 
ultimately, water resources are allocated between and by 
different users – not by a distant, misinformed administrative 
authority”. She argues that the governance structure was 
developed to take historical property rights into account, 
and to encourage existing owners of water rights (especially 
small farmers) to register their right. 
However, others including, for example, Yanez and Orel-
lana, (2007), Unesco (2006), and Bruns et al. (2005) and 
several of the informants mention a number of important 
problems. They indicate that the vertical legislation is man-
aged by government staff without involvement of civil society 
or social control. It neglects customary and indigenous forms 
of water management and contributes to the disintegration 
of collective indigenous systems. The decision-making right is 
now attached to the economic buying power of individuals. 
Large companies (involved in mining, hydroelectric power 
generation, paper production etc.) have claimed an over-
whelming percentage of water rights. The law has resulted in 
monopolies and speculation. The elite who owns the water 
rights have effectively been able to deny the interest of the 
large group of poorer users. Dinar et al. (1997) indicate 
that market transfer of water rights does produce substantial 
gains from trade (of what used to be a free asset). Eventually 
these additional costs are charged to end users, including the 
general population in Chile. Potentially ‘available’ resources 
have been oversold (i.e. more than 100 percent of available 
water allocated for consumptive use) (Alvarez, 2007). Prices 
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of water use rights have also greatly increased, since in many 
areas there are no more water use rights available except 
through competing in the water market. Prices in a water 
auction (allowing indefinite use) can be as high as 8 million 
pesos/litre/sec (USD 18,000) (El Mercurio, 2007). 
Informers also suggest that some Chilean farmers don’t 
even know they have lost their water rights and only now 
find that the old law (before 1981) is no longer valid. If all 
available rights have not yet been allocated they may be 
able to apply for a license, but this requires considerable pa-
perwork and the services of a lawyer, which is unaffordable 
for many poorer water users. If a farmer or an indigenous 
community belatedly finds out that they missed out on an 
allocation, they can only resort to the water market, and 
that is if somebody wants to sell.
Chile amended the law in 2005 seeking to better protect 
the environment and indigenous people. The reform also 
sought to counter speculative use of the market such as 
the hoarding of water rights by the big companies, and to 
free up water rights for those who could not access them 
or did not know that they had to apply for rights earlier. 
A provison has been added that requires the licensee to 
prove that they have the capacity to use the amount of 
water they claimed. If they fail to use allocated water for 
five years, they forfeit their water right. If thereafter more 
parties are interested in securing these forfeited water rights 
they have to go through an auction. This, however, is still 
an advantage for the large companies as they can out-bid 
small farmers and indigenous people, and it seems indeed 
that rights freed up by the reform were later snapped up 
by other big companies.
The reform did manage to improve the collection and dis-
semination of information on water rights. It used to be very 
hard to get access to information that was all stored in the 
capital and not available in digital form. This has changed 
and information is now available to everybody in digital 
form, but has to be requested in writing and paid for. 
Pollution control licensing
Chile has regulation on the emission of certain pollutants 
into waters but according to several informers the list is not 
sufficiently comprehensive. The general approach is that 
companies have to treat and monitor their own wastewater 
and this is occasionally checked by the government. A 
good point is that the law requires Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) but only for companies that discharge on 
larger rivers with a flow over 10 m3/s and not necessarily 
looking at impact under minimum flow conditions. Fortunately 
political interest is increasing to develop this issue further as 
part of a new river basin management policy. 
The law in Chile is generally enforced with warnings, 
deadlines, and if changes are not properly made, the busi-
ness receives a fine or can even be closed for a period. 
But when the cost of the fine is lower than the gain made 
by evading the law, this does little to discourage companies 
from polluting. Companies interviewed argued that more 
environmentally sound mining will be prohibitively expensive. 
Sometimes, however, agencies do show their teeth. In Pela-
mbres a mining company was convicted in 2007 for illegally 
appropriating water rights (La Nacion, 2006). A paper mill 
was fined for polluting the Mataquito River which affected the 
livelihoods of local fishermen. The plant had been emitting 
polluted wastewater without licence since 1992.
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Table 2 summarises potential risks involved in water licensing 
in Chile and Kazakhstan. Whether corruption actually occurs 
will depend according to Klitgaard (1998) on whether the 
size of the corrupt gain is greater than the penalty if caught, 
times the probability of being caught. He indicates that cor-
ruption is a function of the degree of monopoly of someone 
over a service or activity, their discretion in deciding who 
should get how much, and the degree to which their activi-
ties are accountable. Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion 
– Transparency. These issues are explored in Table 3.
Table 2 and 3 show that there is a potential corruption risk 
in water licensing in both countries. In Kazakhstan this relates 
to both the application process where there is a risk of speed 
money being used to facilitate the comprehensive paper work 
and licence enforcement where low paid local controllers 
may be encouraged to turn a blind eye. The situation may 
be further aggravated because it is anticipated that in the 
future, every farmer – instead of every WUA – will have to 
Corruption Risks in Water Licensing
obtain a water permit for volumetric water amounts.
In Chile the potential risk seems to relate more to the 
“traffic of influence” (grand corruption). A strong interconnec-
tion exists between the public and private sector. The latter 
among others are funding political campaigns (according to 
different informants sometimes even taking stakes in different 
parties at the same time) and involve politicians and govern-
ment officials in their boards. In 2003 political campaign 
funding was regulated but still requires further strengthening. 
Part of the underlying interest may be that politicians have 
enormous discretion over appointments. Cases are reported 
in which, for example, electricity company managers have 
made the transition to regulatory agencies and vice versa 
(de Solar, 2008). 
The informants also mentioned cases where people lost 
their job after speaking out about irregularities. Licence en-
forcement seems to entail a lower risk although in wastewater 
disposal this may be an issue.
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Table 2. Potential risks in water licensing in Chile and Kazakhstan 
Risk area Kazakhstan Chile
Licence application 
process
The complicated licence application process 
requires a large number of documents. This incurs 
a high cost for applicants in terms of time and 
resources possibly including speed money.
Licence application is a matter of being informed 
(first come first served). When an Environmental 
Impact Assessment is needed these are often done 
by university staff who may depend on the same 
industry for other work.
The content of the 
licence
The licence is only needed for abstraction of 
large volumes (> 50 m3/sec) and for redistribution 
to others. Civil society is not yet active trying to 
enhance control.
Civil society reports that licence content can be 
influenced. In some areas water is ‘sold’ in access 
of availability. Pollution licences for state owned 
companies are less strict than for private sector. 
Bidding and trad-
ing procedures
Allocation is done by the state agency and no 
trading takes place. In practice head enders 
however can control the water flow and deprive 
tail enders from water without compensation. 
Perhaps as a result cases of damaged and stolen 
control gates are found.
Trading is free, giving an advantage to large 
companies to buy the water rights. Temporarily 
trading among farmers occurs and is seen as an 
advantage as it does not involve large bureauc-
racy. Opportunities for civil society to influence 
the process are very limited. 
Enforcement of 
licence
Insufficient resources are available for enforce-
ment. Controllers can suspend the licence for a 
few days as a warning with potential damage 
to crops. Controllers receive low payment which 
may open up possibilities for bribes. Limited so-
cial pressure exists to enforce licences.
Control agencies are under resourced and still not 
sufficiently developed, but cases of law enforce-
ment do exist. Civil society organisations and the 
media play active roles in trying to avoid envi-
ronmental damage and they support indigenous 
population groups to claim water rights.
Based on results from interviews and literature referenced in this document.
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Table 3. Assessing corruption potential in water licensing
Kazakhstan Chile
M
o
n
o
p
o
ly
Licences are issued by the Water Resource Commis-
sion of the Ministry of Agriculture. This is only needed 
for abstraction of large volumes (> 50 m3/sec) and for 
redistribution to others. In future also smaller uses will 
require a licence.
Applying for the licence involves direct dealing with public 
officials who can influence the speed of the application 
process, according to several informers.
Large mining and electricity companies hold most of 
the water rights. The (now Spanish owned; Kol, 2003) 
hydro electricity company ENDESA holds 81 percent of 
the non-consumptive water use rights at national level 
and even more worrying is that over 100 percent of 
water resources are sold for consumptive use in some 
regions (Alvarez, 2007). The 2005 amendment of the 
law tried to remedy this as licensees have to prove that 
they have the capacity to use the water. This resulted in 
several licences being freed up, but informers indicated 
that most of these rights were subsequently snapped up 
by other powerful buyers. 
D
is
cr
et
io
n
The institutional setting is complex with regulating and 
managing agencies generally lacking authority and staff. 
This implies a lack of adequate monitoring and control. 
Local controllers have the power to close of the water 
if a licensee is not meeting the requirements. A formal 
complaint mechanism does not exist.
Wastewater monitoring is weak and thus allows for 
misreporting and malpractice.
The institutional framework for IWRM is complex. Organi-
sations seem to be understaffed and unable to conduct 
adequate monitoring and control. Politicians have an 
enormous say in staff nominations. 
A strong link exists between politicians, civil servants and 
private sector. The latter finances political campaigns 
and nominates politicians in their boards. Also, leaders 
in the sector sometime rotate between the private and 
public sector. 
Actual opportunities for civil society to really influence or 
participate in the decision-making process are still very 
weakly established under the present legislation. On the 
positive side, complaint mechanisms do exist as well as 
cases of law enforcement and prosecution. 
Tr
a
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
Water policy promotes access to information, yet the hydro-
meteorological service has deteriorated, leading to a lack 
of reliable information on river flows, aggravated by lack 
of information concerning transboundary water.
Corruption is an issue as Kangur et al. (2005) report 
farmer complaints about corruption in the water bureauc-
racy within the Talas basin.
NGOs are limited in number, do not yet work much on wa-
ter and seem to depend very much on Western donors.
 There are, however, some promising processes to 
strengthen civil society participation in newly established 
River Basin Organizations and River Basin Councils (RBCs) 
that may promote accountability.
Water policy promotes access to information but water 
rights registries are not easily accessible. The director of 
DGA confirms that information is often inaccurate and 
incomplete but they are willing to improve. According 
to Chile Transparente (Local Transparency International 
Chapter), DGA publishes proceedings of critical work-
shops. In the region of Aysen, DGA in collaboration 
with others including civil society, are running informa-
tion campaigns and education on the functioning of the 
Water Code and water resource protection. NGOs play 
a very active role in trying to enhance transparency and 
protect the environment, which is not always appreciated 
by those with vested interests. Sometimes they face very 
serious threats. The same is the case for investigative 
journalists who despite the media openness may face 
law suites or even death threats.
Based on results from interviews and literature referenced in this document 
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The case studies show that the potential for corruption in 
water licensing is an important issue. It is at the heart of 
equitable and sustainable IWRM. Such studies can also 
help to better take local conditions into account in water 
policies and regulatory systems. Often such policies are 
developed with help of international organisations, building 
on experience in countries with better control mechanisms. 
Many local realities, however, imply dated infrastructures 
with low levels of monitoring and control mechanisms and 
a lack of data to ensure equitable resource distribution and 
proper law enforcement. Whereas legal reform is ongoing, 
a lot of water use and pollution still remains un-licensed and 
unregulated. This particularly relates to smaller users and to 
groundwater and wastewater pollution licensing. In view 
of the large number of users and the limited administrative 
capacities, creative solutions need to be found for proper 
allocation and control mechanisms without increasing bu-
reaucracy and potential corruption. Extending effective 
informal systems may be more effective in some cases than 
building parallel formal systems for example.
In both market (Chile) and state-focused (Kazakhstan) 
water licensing systems, the potential for corruption exists 
with licensing being administered by under-funded, under-
Conclusion and Follow-up
equipped, and under-coordinated regulating agencies. Risks 
in water licensing are apparent both in Chile, which scores 
well in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) rankings, and Kazakhstan where corruption is 
generally perceived as being much worse as reflected by 
its much lower CPI ranking. Both systems face important 
challenges, different in nature, but similar in effect (inequita-
ble water distribution, lack of protection, sustainability and 
efficient use, systems skewed towards the powerful). This 
makes steps to reduce corruption opportunities important, 
but as indicated by Klitgaard (1998), this should not result 
in generating so much red tape and bureaucracy that the 
costs and losses in efficiency would outweigh the benefits 
of reduced corruption potential. 
Preventive actions to reduce the risk of corruption in water 
licensing particularly relate to: 
•	 Simplification	of	procedures	for	licensing	(to	reduce	op-
portunities for petty corruption), including the possible 
application of more informal, traditional and local 
control mechanisms. Responsibilities of licensor and li-
censee need to be very clear and need to be properly 
enforced.
Ph
ot
o:
 K
ai
 W
eg
er
ic
h
18
•	 Exploring	opportunities	for	more	equitable	(initial)	
water allocation to avoid that powerful buyers can 
capture the market and to better protect local tradi-
tional rights
•	 Strengthening	regulatory,	administrative	and	monitor-
ing capacity (through appropriate laws and resources) 
including the necessary legal mechanisms to redress 
abuses.
•	 Ensuring	that	licensing	and	control	matches	the	local	
administrative and infrastructural reality so that rules 
won’t just remain good intentions.
•	 Improve	staff	conditions	in	regulation	and	control	agen-
cies, including applying transparent staff nomination 
procedures, strengthening accountability measures and 
increasing staff remuneration to reduce risk of petty 
corruption (bribes). 
•	 Improving	coordination	between	IWRM organisations 
and stimulating the discussion around the need to 
reduce corruption risks. This is also very important in 
relation to transboundary arrangements which require 
transparent collaboration between organisations from 
different countries.
•	 Establishing	independent	oversight	and	encourag-
ing civil society organisations (including possible 
independent funding) and the media to proceed with 
their important signalling role to balance the lobby-
ing power of the private sector. For example, in Chile 
lively Internet communications have strong support from 
civil society organisations.
•	 Protecting	whistleblowers	and	creating	opportunities	
for anonymous reporting of problems. 
•	 Improving	public	access	to	information	concerning	
water license application, monitoring and enforcement. 
This may include public access to annual reports of 
agencies involved in the process but also improvement 
in the collection and processing of hydrological infor-
mation and pollution data in support of monitoring. 
Finding corruption risks in water licensing in two very 
different countries suggests that such risks also exists in 
many other countries, but as yet little attention is paid to 
this problem. This implies that the issue should be pushed 
up the agenda. Many people may already be aware of 
the need for improvement and further reform as shown by 
senior staff of the regulator in Chile, but they need to be 
encouraged to build alliances with other actors including civil 
society organisations. Broad coordinated efforts are needed 
that improve transparency, limit or control monopoly, and 
limit regulator discretion through streamlining the number of 
agencies involved, improving coordination and strengthen-
ing checks and balances. A good start may be to follow 
a similar approach as in this study by exploring corruption 
risks through literature review and interviews as an input 
for a broader discussion and follow up action. Preferably, 
this will be based on alliances between key institutions in 
IWRM including national and international research institu-
tions and NGOs.
The challenge in better governance of water resources 
clearly transcends the water sector. But judging by these 
two cases it requires a detailed look at the issue of water 
licensing to improve equitable and sustainable resource 
management. Ph
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Water resource licensing is increasingly becoming a corner-
stone for integrated water resources management (IWRM). 
Licensing and other allocation mechanisms are important 
because they underpin who gets access to water and provide 
a means to manage water fairly, efficiently and sustainably. 
Water licensing is often in the hands of young institutions 
operating under new laws and sometimes organised along 
water basins rather than traditional administrative boundaries. 
With growing water scarcity in an increasing number of 
countries, there is a significantly greater risk of corruption 
in the water licensing process. This risk, and its underlying 
factors, are not well understood. This report explores the 
nature of the risk using a 2007 field study of Chile and 
Kazakhstan as case studies for risk mitigation.
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